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SUMMARY
The vast majority of work in machine vision emphasizes the representation of perceived objects and events:
it is these internal representations that incorporate the `knowledge' in knowledge-based vision or form the
`models' in model-based vision. In this paper, we discuss simple machine vision systems developed by arti-
¢cial evolution rather than traditional engineering design techniques, and note that the task of identifying
internal representations within such systems is made di¤cult by the lack of an operational de¢nition of
representation at the causal mechanistic level. Consequently, we question the nature and indeed the exis-
tence of representations posited to be used within natural vision systems (i.e. animals). We conclude that
representations argued for on a priori grounds by external observers of a particular vision system may well
be illusory, and are at best place-holders for yet-to-be-identi¢ed causal mechanistic interactions. That is,
applying the knowledge-based vision approach in the understanding of evolved systems (machines or
animals) may well lead to theories and models that are internally consistent, computationally plausible,
and entirely wrong.
1. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of work in machine vision empha-
sizes the representation of perceived objects and
events: it is these internal representations that are the
`knowledge' in knowledge-based vision and the
`models' in model-based vision. In this paper, we
argue that such notions of representation may have
little use in explaining the operation of simple
machine vision systems that have been developed by
arti¢cial evolution rather than through traditional
engineering design techniques, and which are, there-
fore, of questionable value in furthering our
understanding of vision in animals, which are also the
product of evolutionary processes.
This is not to say that representations do not exist or
are not useful: there are many potential applications of
machine vision, of practical engineering importance,
where signi¢cant problems are alleviated or avoided
altogether by use of appropriate structured representa-
tions. Examples include medical imaging, terrain
mapping, and tra¤c monitoring (e.g. Taylor et al. 1986;
Sullivan 1992).
But the success of these engineering endeavours may
encourage us to assume that similar representations are
of use in explaining vision in animals. In this paper, we
argue that such assumptions may be misleading.Yet the
assumption that vision is fundamentally dependent on
representations (and further assumptions involving the
nature of those representations) is widespread.We seek
only to highlight problems with these assumptions;
problems which appear to stem from incautious use of
the notion of `representation'. We argue in particular
that the notion of representation as the construction of
an internal model representing some external situation
is probably not applicable to evolved systems. This
paper is intentionally provocative; the arguments put
forward below are o¡ered for discussion, rather than
as unquestionable truths.
We start, in ½ 2, by brie£y reviewing two key in£u-
ences in the development of the view of vision as a
process that forms representations for subsequent
manipulation. Then, in ½ 3, we discuss simple visual
machines by (i) summarizing the process of arti¢cial
evolution, (ii) then reviewing work where arti¢cial
evolution has been used to evolve design speci¢cations
for visual sensorimotor controllers, and (iii) discussing
the issue of identifying representations in these evolved
designs. Following this, ½ 4 explores further the issue of
de¢ning the notion of representation with su¤cient
accuracy for it to be of use in empirically determining
whether representations are employed by a system.
Finally, in ½ 5 we explore the implications of these
issues for the study of vision in animals, before o¡ering
our conclusions in ½ 6.
2 . BACKGROUND
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to
provide a complete historical account of the key in£u-
ences on the development of present knowledge-based
vision techniques and practices, there are two major
works that permeate almost all knowledge-based
vision with which we are familiar. These are the
Physical Symbol System Hypothesis of Newell &
Simon (1976) and Marr's (1982) work on vision.
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(a) The Physical Symbol System hypothesis
Newell & Simon (1976) were instrumental in estab-
lishing the belief that systems which engage in the
syntactic manipulation of symbols and symbol struc-
tures have the necessary and su¤cient means for
general intelligent action. For Newell & Simon the
symbols are arbitrary, but their interpretation and
semantics (i.e. what the symbols represent) are socially
agreed between observers of the symbol system. Under
this hypothesis, intelligent action involves the receipt of
symbols from symbol-generating sensory apparatus,
the subsequent manipulation of those symbols (e.g. by
using techniques derived from mathematical logic, or
algorithmic search), in order to produce an output
symbol or symbol structure. Both the input and the
output have meaning conferred on them by external
observers, rather than the meaning being intrinsic to
the symbol (Harnad 1990).
In the ¢eld of arti¢cial intelligence, Newell &
Simon's hypothesis licensed a paradigm of research
concentrating on intelligence as the manipulation of
symbolic representations, and on perception as the
generation of those symbols and symbol structures.
Specialized symbol-manipulating and logic-based
computer programming languages such as Lisp (e.g.
Winston & Horn 1980) and Prolog (e.g. Clocksin &
Mellish 1984) (from `LISt Processing' and `PROgram-
ming in LOGic', respectively) were developed to ease
the creation of `knowledge-based systems' (e.g.
Gonzalez & Dankel 1993). In due course, undergrad-
uate textbooks appeared that essentially treated the
hypothesis as an axiomatic truth (e.g. Nilsson 1982;
Charniak & McDermott 1985), paying little attention
to criticisms of the approach (e.g. Dreyfus 1979, 1981).
In the ¢eld of machine vision, the Physical Symbol
System Hypothesis underwrites all research on know-
ledge-based vision, where it is assumed that the aim of
vision is to deliver symbolic representations (or
`models') of the objects in a visual scene: in the words
of Pentland (1986), to go `from pixels to predicates'.
This mapping from visual images to predicate-level
representations was studied in depth by David Marr.
(b) Marr's theories of vision
Marr's (1982) work on vision had an enormous
impact on practices in machine vision. He argued
forcefully and coherently for vision to be treated as a
data-driven, bottom-up process which delivers repre-
sentations of three-dimensional (3D) shape from two-
dimensional (2D) images. Marr cites studies of vision
in humans as being in£uential in the development of
his theories: in particular the mental rotation experi-
ments of Shepard & Metzler (1971) and the parietal
lesion data of Warrington & Taylor (1973, 1978).
In Shepard &Metzler's experiments, human subjects
were shown pairs of line-drawings of simple objects,
and were asked to discriminate whether the two
images were projections of the same 3D object viewed
from di¡erent poses, or images of two di¡erent but
mirror-symmetric objects viewed from di¡erent poses.
Their results (which remain the subject of debate) indi-
cated that the length of time taken for subjects to
identify that the two images di¡ered only in pose (i.e.
were of the same object) was linearly related to the
degree of 3D rotation involved in the di¡erence in
pose. From these results (and, indeed, via introspection
if one attempts to perform this discrimination task) it is
compelling to conclude that the nervous system gener-
ates some internal representation of 3D shape from one
2D image, and then somehow manipulates it to deter-
mine whether it can match the second 2D image.
Warrington & Taylor's results concerned human
patients who had su¡ered brain lesions in the left or
right parietal areas. Left-lesioned patients could
perceive the shape of an object from a wide variety of
poses, but could o¡er little or no description of its
`semantics': its name or its purpose. Meanwhile, right-
lesioned patients could describe the semantics of an
object, provided it was presented from a c`onventional'
pose or view-angle; if the view was somehow `uncon-
ventional', such as a clarinet viewed end-on, the right-
lesioned patients would not be able to recognize the
object, and in some cases they would actively dispute
that the view could be one of that object.
These results, and other considerations, led Marr to
conclude that the main job of vision is to derive repre-
sentations of the shapes and positions of things from
images. Other issues (such as the illumination and
re£ectances of surfaces; their brightness and colours
and textures; their motion) .` . . seemed secondary'
(Marr 1982, p. 36).
In Marr's approach, vision is fundamentally an
information-processing task, attempting to recover 3D
information hidden or implicit in the 2D image. Marr
proposed that such information-processing tasks, or the
devices that execute them, should be analysed using a
three-level methodology:
`[There are three] di¡erent levels at which an infor-
mation-processing device must be understood before
one can be said to have understood it completely. At
one extreme, the top level, is the abstract computa-
tional theory of the device, in which the performance
of the device is characterized as a mapping from one
kind of information to another, the abstract properties
of this mapping are de¢ned precisely, and its appropri-
ateness and adequacy for the task at hand are
demonstrated. In the center is the choice of representa-
tion for the input and output and the algorithm to be
used to transform one into the other. And at the other
extreme are the details of how the algorithm and repre-
sentation are realized physicallyöthe detailed
computer architecture, so to speak.' (Marr 1982, p. 24.)
Application of this three-level methodology to the
problem of analysing vision led Marr and his collea-
gues to develop a theory of vision involving a pipeline
of processes applying transformations to intermediate
representations derived from the initial image (Marr
1982, p. 37): the ambient optic array is sampled to
form a 2D image, which represents intensities; the
image is then operated on to form the `primal sketch',
which represents important information about the 2D
image such as the intensity changes and their geome-
trical distribution and organization. Following this,
the primal sketch is processed to form the `21=2D
sketch', which represents orientation and rough depth
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of visible surfaces, and any contours of discontinuities
in these quantities, still in a viewer-centred coordinate
frame. Next, the 21=2D sketch is processed to form an
internal `3D model', which represents shapes and their
spatial organization in an object-centred coordinate
frame; including information about volume. Hence,
the 3D model is an internal reconstruction of the
external physical world.
Within Marr's framework, formation of the 3D
model is the end of the visual process, and the model is
then passed to `higher' processes, such as updating or
matching against a stored library of 3D shapes. Since
the initial development and publication of these ideas,
much knowledge-based vision has been based on this
approach.
Over the last decade, the increasing research activity
in a`ctive vision' (e.g. Ballard 1991), where the camera
that forms the image is under dynamic control of the
vision system, has led to a number of criticisms being
levelled at Marr's approach (e.g. Nelson 1991; Horswill
1993).
3. SIMPLE VISUAL MACHINES
Traditional modular engineering design techniques,
based on dividing a given problem into a number of
sub-problems such that each sub-problem can be
resolved using a separate computational module,
require intermediate representations for inter-module
communication. The task of each computational
module is to receive input data in a pre-speci¢ed repre-
sentation, apply some required transformation, and
pass on the result of the transformation as the output
of the module. The Marr pipeline is a ¢ne example of
this approach: to go from image to 3D model in one
step is unrealistically ambitious; instead, a sequence of
operations is applied to the image, generating succes-
sive internal representations, leading to the ¢nal
desired representation. Given that such techniques are
well-established in engineering design and manifestly
successful in a number of potentially very problematic
task domains, it is di¤cult to conceive of alternatives.
However, recent work in adaptive behaviour (see the
journal Adaptive Behavior, published by MIT Press, or
the proceedings of the biennial conference on simula-
tion of adaptive behaviour (Meyer & Wilson 1991;
Meyer et al. 1993; Cli¡ et al. 1994; Maes et al. 1996)) has
employed arti¢cial evolution (i.e. genetic algorithms) as an
alternative to traditional design techniques. In these
studies, simple visual machines (either real robots or
simulated agents existing within virtual realities) have
been evolved to perform a variety of behaviours
mediated by vision or other distal sensing (e.g. sonar,
infrared (IR) proximity detectors). Typically, the
sensorimotor c`ontrollers' of these machines are parallel
distributed processing systems: commonly, arti¢cial
neural networks simulated on a fast serial computer,
but also in at least one case (Thompson 1995) real
parallel asynchronous analogue electronic circuits. In
these studies there is no precommitment to any particular
representational scheme: the desired behaviour is speci-
¢ed, but there is minimal speci¢cation of the
mechanism required to generate that behaviour. In the
following three sections we give (i) a brief introduction
to arti¢cial evolution, (ii) some examples of arti¢cially
evolved simple visual machines, and (iii) then discuss
further the issue of representation in these systems.
(a) Arti¢cial evolution
Arti¢cial evolution encompasses a number of compu-
tational optimization or satis¢cing techniques which
draw inspiration from biological evolution. Only the
simplest form of g`enetic algorithm' will be explained
here, with speci¢c reference to developing sensorimotor
controllers for simple visual machines; for further
details, see, for example Goldberg (1989).
In order to apply a genetic algorithm it is necessary
to ¢rst formulate an encoding scheme and a ¢tness function.
The encoding scheme is a method of encoding the
designs of sensorimotor c`ontroller' mechanisms (and
possibly also the sensor and motor morphology) as
strings of characters from a ¢nite alphabet, referred to
as g`enomes'. The ¢tness function takes the spatiotem-
poral pattern of behaviour of a given individual
controller (decoded from a given genome) over one or
more trials, and assigns that individual a scalar value
which is referred to as its ¢tness, such that desirable
behaviours are awarded higher ¢tness than less desir-
able behaviours.
The system is initialized by creating a `population' of
individuals, each with a randomly generated genome.
The system then enters a loop: all individuals are
tested and assigned a ¢tness score. Individuals with
higher ¢tness values have a greater chance of being
selected for breeding. In breeding, the genomes of two
parents are mixed in a similar manner to recombinant
DNA transfer in sexual reproduction, and extra varia-
tion is introduced by `mutations' where characters at
randomly-chosen positions on the genotype are
randomly `£ipped' to some other character from the
genome-alphabet. Su¤ciently many new individuals
are bred to replace the old population, which is then
discarded. Following this, the new population is tested
to assign a ¢tness to each individual. In each cycle of
testing the population and breeding a replacement is
referred to as one generation, and generally a genetic
algorithm runs for a pre-set number of generations, or
until the best or average ¢tness in the population
reaches a plateau.
If parameters such as the mutation rate, ¢tness func-
tion, and selection pressure are all set correctly, then
typically ¢tness increases over a number of generations:
at the end of the experiment, the best individual
genome encodes for a useful design. The ¢nal evolved
design can then be implemented and analysed to deter-
mine how it functions.
In evolving sensorimotor controllers, a variety of
possible `building blocks' can be employed: for a
comprehensive review and critique, see Mataric¨ &
Cli¡ (1995). In many of the systems discussed in the
next section, continuous-time recurrent neural
networks (CTRNNs) are employed: these are arti¢cial
neural networks composed of `neurone' units with
speci¢ed time-constants giving each neurone an
intrinsic dynamics. The primary reasons for employing
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such neural networks are (i) their sigmoidal activation
function allows them to approximate a very wide class
of mathematical functions; (ii) their recurrent connec-
tions allow them to maintain their internal state; and
(iii) there is a theoretical result which suggests that,
appropriately con¢gured, they can approximate a very
large class of continuous dynamical systems with arbi-
trary accuracy. (See Beer (1995b) for further details.)
The evolved simple visual machines described below
are all both embodied and situated within an environ-
ment: the emphasis is on the evolution of entire
sensory-motor coordination mechanisms or processing
pathways, constrained only in terms of the ¢tness of
the observable behaviour of the agent. This contrasts
with many arti¢cial neural network models, where the
constraint is that (either by learning or evolution) the
network is capable of making appropriate mappings
from a given input representation to a given output
representation: modelling entire sensorimotor path-
ways has a signi¢cant impact on the semantics of any
representations within the system, see Cli¡ (1991, 1995).
(b) Examples
As far as we are aware, the ¢rst case of an evolved
arti¢cial agent using distal sensing was the simulation
study by Cli¡ et al. (1993a) (see also Cli¡ et al. 1993b).
In this work, CTRNNs were evolved, along with the
speci¢cation of the angle of acceptance and physical
arrangement of the visual sensors on the robot body.
Only two simulated photodetectors (i.e. two `pixels')
were used, but the robot was successfully evolved to
visually navigate its way to the centre of a simple
arena: a closed circular room with a white £oor and
ceiling, and a black wall.
Subsequently, Harvey et al. (1994) evolved CTRNNs
for real-time control of a robot camera head moving in
another visually simple environment. The head was
mounted with touch sensors and a low-bandwidth
charge-coupled device video camera. Networks with
three circular receptive ¢elds sampling the input video
stream were evolved, with the position and radius of
the receptive ¢elds under genetic control. The networks
were selected on the basis of their ability to approach a
triangular visual target, and avoid a rectangular
target: a simple visual categorization task.
Floreano & Mondada (1994) evolved feed-forward
neural networks for a simple robot with an eight-pixel
input `image' formed by the inputs of photodetector
cells placed around the perimeter of its body (an
upright cylinder of height 4 cm and radius 3 cm).
These network controllers were evolved to guide the
robot through a maze-like environment, attempting to
maximize the distance travelled without colliding with
the walls of the maze.
Thompson (1995) developed a genetic encoding for
electronic circuits composed of digital logic gates,
which were asynchronous and recurrently connected,
so that the analogue properties of the circuits could be
exploited by evolution. The distal sensors were ultra-
sonic sonars, rather than visual; economical circuits
were evolved to allow the robot to guide itself to the
centre of a rectangular enclosure using sonar responses.
Jakobi (1994) and Jakobi et al. (1995) reported the
development of a simulator for the same type of eight-
pixel robot used by Floreana & Mondada. They
evolved CTRNNs in simulation which could then be
successfully transferred to the real robot, generating
behaviours which guided the robot towards a light
source, while avoiding collisions with obstacles (a task
similar to that studied by Franceschini et al. (1992)).
Cli¡ & Miller (1996) evolved CTRNNs for simu-
lated 2D agents using projective geometry to give a
`£atland vision' approximation to visual sensing, with
up to 14 pixels in the sensory input vector. Separate
populations of `predator' and `prey' agents were
evolved. The predators were selected for on the basis of
their ability to approach, chase, or capture individuals
from the prey population; and prey individuals were
selected for their ability to avoid being captured by the
co-evolving predators.
Finally, Beer (1996) evolved CTRNNs for simulated
agents with distal sensing using either ¢ve or seven
directional proximity detectors: the agents had to
perform what Beer refers to as `minimally cognitive
tasks', i.e. behaviours that would usually be assumed
to require some form of internal representation or cate-
gorization, such as orienting to objects of one particular
shape, distinguishing between di¡erent shapes, and
pointing a `hand' at certain shapes.
(c) The search for internal representations
All of the evolved simple visual machines discussed
above perform tasks that are trivial by the standards
of most machine vision research. There is little or no
doubt that these tasks could all be solved using a
knowledge-based approach, involving a sequence of
transformations on appropriate internal representa-
tions. Yet the signi¢cance of these machines is not the
complexity of the problems they solve or the behaviours
they exhibit, but rather the way in which their design
was produced. In contrast to traditional engineering
design techniques, the use of an evolutionary approach
with minimal pre-commitments concerning internal
architecture or representations makes the question
`What types of representation do these machines use?'
an empirical one. That is, we must examine or analyse
the evolved designs, generate hypotheses about the
representations employed, and test those hypotheses in
an appropriate manner. Possibly, the evolutionary
process will have resulted in a knowledge-based or
model-based solution, in which case appropriate repre-
sentations will be found; or possibly not.
And it is on this issue that the true signi¢cance of
these simple visual machines is revealed: as far as we
are aware, no analysis of the evolved systems described
above has identi¢ed the use of representations or
knowledge in the conventional (physical symbol
system) sense. That is, none of these systems operate by
forming a representation of the external environment,
and then reasoning with or acting upon that represen-
tation (e.g. by comparison with, or reference to, in-built
or acquired representations). This is in spite of the fact
that a machine-vision engineer, conversant in the
methods of knowledge-based vision, could (trivially)
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develop an appropriate computational theory for any of
these tasks, identify appropriate representations and
transformation algorithms to act on them, and specify
an implementation in some physical hardware. Evolu-
tion, working with primitive building blocks to
construct parallel distributed processing architectures
for these tasks, just does not do it the knowledge-based
way.
This is not to say that the operation of these systems
is a mystery. Full causal mechanistic explanations of the
evolved systems can be o¡ered via analysis, typically
using the tools and language of dynamical systems
theory. (For further discussion of the rationale for and
use of dynamical systems theory as an alternative to
computational/representational accounts of cognition,
see Smithers (1992, 1995), Thelen & Smith (1994), Port
& van Gelder (1995) and Beer (1995a).) Causal
mechanistic explanations are also the ultimate aim of
much work in analysing evolved biological systems
(Horridge 1977).
For example, the two-pixel controllers evolved to
guide a simulated robot to the centre of a circular
room (Cli¡ et al. 1993), have been analysed both quali-
tatively (Cli¡ et al. 1997) and quantitatively (Husbands
et al. 1995). The behaviour of the robots can be
explained and predicted by reference to the dynamics
of the agent^environment interaction. The CTRRNs
can maintain their internal state, and the state-space
of the networks has certain identi¢able attractors
which correspond to (or are correlated with) certain
situations or relationships between the agent and the
environment, such as the robot being at the centre of
the room. There is a closed sensory-motor loop, in the
sense that the changing state of the network is a¡ected
by the current and past inputs to the sensors, which are
determined by the path the robot takes through the
environment, which is in turn determined by the chan-
ging state of the network. When the robot is released
into the environment at a particular orientation and
location, the sensors receive certain light values, which
can perturb the state-space trajectory of the CTRNN,
which a¡ects the motor outputs, possibly moving the
robot, and hence altering the light values subsequently
sampled by the sensors. As this state-space trajectory
unfolds, the robot can be observed to be moving
toward the centre of the circular room, and staying
there once it arrives, but there is nothing within the
CTRNN that can usefully be described as a representa-
tion. There is nothing, for example, corresponding to a
stored version of a g`oal state' such as the sensory inputs
received when at the centre of the room, or a method
for determining, on the basis of comparison with
stored values, whether the robot should turn left or
right, move forward or reverse, or stop.
Of course, it is famously di¤cult to prove a negative,
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full
illustrative example analysis of one of the evolved
systems listed above, but a simple thought experiment,
adapted from Braitenberg (1984), will serve as a useful
illustration. Consider the design for a simple visually-
guided wheeled robot with a body plan symmetric
about its longitudinal axis. At the front, on the long
axis, is a single castor-wheel. At the rear left and rear
right, there are identically sized wheels, attached to
independent electrical motors with colinear axles. The
robots are di¡erential-steer devices (by altering the
angular velocities of the two rear wheels, the robots
can travel in arcs of varying radii, either clockwise or
anticlockwise). At the front-left and front-right of the
robot there is a forward-pointing light sensor. A wire
leads from each sensor into a black box where some
control circuitry and batteries are hidden. Wires lead
from the black box to the two drive motors. Two such
robots, marked A and B, are placed in a dark room
with no obstacles except for a £oor-mounted light-
bulb. When the light-bulb is switched on, robot A
(which was initially not pointing toward the light-
bulb) turns to face the bulb and accelerates toward it,
only stopping when it hits it. Meanwhile, robot B
(which was initially facing the light-bulb) turns away
from the bulb, moving fast at ¢rst but then more
slowly until it comes gently to a halt. If we were now
to ask a knowledge-based vision engineer to theorize
about what might be hidden inside the black boxes of
robots A and B, s/he would, presumably, in following
Marr's three levels of analysis, ¢rst formulate a compu-
tational theory for each robot, characterizing the
performance of each as a mapping from one kind of
information to another, and thereby establishing a link
from visual information received at the sensors to infor-
mation concerning appropriate motor outputs. The
engineer would then determine the representations for
input and outputs, and any intermediate representa-
tions, and the algorithm(s) for transforming between
them; ¢nally s/he would address issues of how the
representations and algorithms can be realized physi-
cally. Quite probably, the solution will involve
measuring the signals received from the left and right
sensors, comparing them (or their di¡erence) to some
reference values, and issuing appropriate motor
commands on the outcome of the comparison. Given
enough time and money, we have no doubt that such
controllers could be built and would operate success-
fully. But, upon opening the black-box controllers on
A and B, there is a surprise lurking. The black box in
A simply has a wire connecting the left-hand sensor to
the right-hand motor, via an appropriate ampli¢er, and
a wire connecting the right-hand sensor to the left-
hand motor, again via an ampli¢er. Similarly, the
black box in B has nothing but an ampli¢er sitting
between a wire joining the left sensor to the left motor,
and another ampli¢er between the right sensor and the
right motor. All the ampli¢ers do is ensure that the
signals coming from the light sensors are magni¢ed
su¤ciently to drive the motors: they provide a
constant of proportionality, but essentially each motor
is driven by a direct connection from one sensor.
(Readers familiar with Braitenberg (1984) will recog-
nize A as the contralaterallyconnectedVehicle 3a, andB
as the ipsilaterally connected Vehicle 3b.) This is all it
takes to generate the observed behaviours. And the
key issue here is that, despite the knowledge-based
vision engineer being able to specify representation-
manipulating controllers, the actual controllers for
these two vehicle robots use no representations. Their
observable behaviour is a result of the dynamics of
Knowledge-based vision and simple visual machines D. Cli¡ and J. Noble 1169
Phil.Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1997)
interaction between the agent (robot) and the environ-
ment (£oor of a dark room and a light-bulb). A
complete account of the behaviour of either agent
requires treating the agent and environment as
coupled (through a sensory motor loop); and there is
no useful de¢nition of `representation' that allows any
variable with these coupled systems to be described as
a representation to the agent of any external object, situa-
tion, or event. Of course, this argument rests on the
de¢nition of `representation', a point we return to
below.
Just as the Braitenberg vehicles use no representa-
tions, so we argue that the arti¢cially evolved simple
visual machines discussed previously use no representa-
tions. Now it should be noted that, in the majority of
cases, the researchers responsible for the evolved
simple visual machines are highly doubtful as to
whether traditional notions of representation serve any
useful purpose in explaining cognitive systems (arti¢-
cial or natural). Their work is part of a wider
movement within the Adaptive Behaviour research
community that questions or rejects traditional
symbolic notions of representation (for overviews, see
for example, Brooks 1991a,b).
For this reason, it is pertinent to ask whether (and
with all due respect to the researchers involved) repre-
sentation has not been identi¢ed in these machines,
because the researchers had a vested interest in not
¢nding any. Put another way: if evolution did produce
a design that used internal representations, how would
we recognize it ? This requires a ¢rm de¢nition of
representation: preferably an operational de¢nition
(i.e. the speci¢cation of a procedure by which an inde-
pendent third party could establish whether
representations are being used or not). It is this issue of
attempting to usefully de¢ne `representation' that we
turn to in the next section: analysis may identify
causal interactions, or high order correlations, but
surely a representation is more than just an interaction
or a correlation?
4 . WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A
REPRESENTATION ?
Harvey (1992, 1996) argues that the only meaningful
sense in which internal representations can be discussed
in cognitive systems is to recognize that the verb `repre-
sent' should be treated as a four-place predicate: that P
is used by Q to represent R to S. For example, the char-
acter string `mast' is used by writers of English to
represent `long upright pole on which the sails of a
ship are carried' to English readers. But people writing
in Serbo-Croat use exactly the same character string to
represent `ointment, fat, or lard' to Serbo-Croat
readers: as Harvey emphasizes, Q and S are necessary
to allow for the same P representing di¡erent Rs to
di¡erent P-using communities. So, to talk of represen-
tations in vision (and anywhere else), we need to
determine who or what are ¢lling the roles of Q and S.
We, as external observers, can safely talk of patterns of
activity in the nervous system as representing external
objects or events to us: Q and S are us humans engaging
in a discourse where it is socially agreed that the neural
activity patterns (P) represent some external object(s)
or event(s) (R). But to talk about the patterns being
representations used by the agent (robot or animal)
implies that an agent-within-the-agent is somehow
`reading' these representations: if P is some representa-
tional pattern of activity on a de¢ned set of neurones,
and we say that P represents some external object or
event R, then we should also be able to specify Q and
S. If we want to de¢ne Q as the collection of neurones
over which the pattern P is detected, then what is S?
Some other part of the agent's neural system, excluding
the neurones in Q? If that is the case, then it is not the
agent as a whole that is using the representations: the
agent becomes decomposed into a community of sub-
agents, forming, using, and exchanging representations.
Of course, systems designed by traditional engineering
techniques can be described this way. But applying this
style of description to an evolved agent requires care:
Harvey's reasoning implies that, unless used carefully,
explanation of an agent's neural mechanisms in terms
of representations used `by the agent' can hide an
implicit homunculus: the (sub-)agent that reads the
representation. And with this homunculus comes the
manifest danger of in¢nite regress.
One means by which a representation can be distin-
guished from a correlation is by noting that Harvey's
argument implies that representations are essentially
linguistic (i.e. they form an interlingua between repre-
sentation-using agents or entities). A representation
should therefore be normative: it should at least o¡er
the opportunity to misrepresent; to more or less
correctly capture some external state of a¡airs. In the
simple visual machines discussed above, there is no
representation because there is no possibility of mis-
representation.We, the external observers, can point to
the activity patterns and refer to them as representa-
tions in explaining the system, and be right or wrong
to varying degrees about what those patterns represent.
But to talk of the agent using the representations is to
confuse patterns of activity which represent something
else, and patterns of activity which actually constitute
the agent's perceptual or experiential world, a point
forcefully made by Brooks & Stein:
`There is an argument that certain components of
stimulus-response systems are `` symbolic''. For example,
if a particular neuron ¢resöor a particular wire carries
a positive voltageöwhenever something red is visible,
that neuronöor wireömay be said to `` represent'' the
presence of something red. While this argument may
be perfectly reasonable as an observer's explanation of
the system, it should not be mistaken for an explanation
of what the agent in question believes. In particular, the
positive voltage on the wire does not represent the
presence of red to the agent; the positive voltage is the
presence of something red as far as the robot is
concerned.' (Brooks & Stein (1994), original emphasis.)
It could be argued that the simple systems studied so
far are merely demonstrations that `knowledge' and
`structured representations' are not required for such
simple tasks, but will be necessary for more complex
tasks.We disagree.
Rather, we argue that `knowledge' and its `represen-
tation' may be nothing more than constructs from folk-
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psychology. We maintain that these terms are best
viewed as place-holders for yet-to-be-identi¢ed causal
mechanistic interactions: philosophically, this is a posi-
tion of eliminative materialism such as that ¢rst
proposed by Churchland (1979, 1989) and subsequently
argued for by Smithers (1992). Such a position also has
clear parallels with the work of Braitenberg (1984), who
demonstrated that mentalistic notions such as `fear' and
a`ggression' are easily imputed by external observers of
his Vehicle series of simple visual machines, two of
which were introduced in the thought experiment
discussed earlier. Brie£y, Braitenberg's argument is
that human observers ascribe mental states to the vehi-
cles when describing their actions (e.g. `robot A
approaches light-bulbs aggressively' or `robot B is frigh-
tened of light and turns away from it'), yet these
mentalistic terms have no place in explanations of the
causal mechanisms involved in the generation of those
behaviours.
In sum, our position is that `knowledge' and its
`representation' are useful notions at levels of explana-
tion higher than the causally mechanistic; and in
particular are valuable when analysis has yet to
uncover the causal mechanisms involved in the visual
processing mechanisms of interest. But that when an
evolved system is fully analysed at the causal mechan-
istic level, there is no useful place for these terms.
For this reason, we ¢nd it hard to agree with state-
ments such as that from the synopsis of this Discussion
Meeting: .` . . visual systems acquire and use knowledge
in many ways. It is encoded into . . . visual systems by
evolution and perhaps still more by individual experi-
ence.' For evolved simple visual machines, although it
is useful for us to talk of `knowledge encoded into
visual systems' before we analyse them, once the analysis
is complete and we have a causal mechanistic explana-
tion of the system, there are only the interaction
dynamics: there is nothing we can point to (or wave
our hands over, for fans of `distributed representations')
as the knowledge in the system. It is as elusive as the
Ghost InThe Machine.
5. IS THE SAME TRUE OF ANIMALS ?
Given the existence of evolved arti¢cial systems
which exhibit visually guided behaviours yet employ
no representations, it is compelling to consider
whether similar systems exist in the natural world.
Although there is no animal for which a complete
analysis (comparable to the analyses of the arti¢cial
systems enumerated above) is available, we discuss
below some suggestive results from phylogenetically
diverse animals.
The visual systems of insects, especially the dipteran
£ies, have been subjected to extensive studies. Examples
include fruit-£ies such as Drosophila melanogaster (e.g.
Wolf & Heisenberg 1991), hover-£ies such as Syritta
pipiens (e.g. Collett & Land 1975a), and house-£ies
such as Musca domestica (e.g. Reichardt & Guo 1986) or
Fannia canicularis (e.g. Land & Collett 1974).
These are, probably, the natural systems for which it
is most realistic to attempt a complete causal mechan-
istic explanation of the couplings between (visual)
sensors and motors. Hence, if vision by de¢nition
involves the formation and manipulation of representa-
tions, these are also the animals in which we are most
likely to be able to identify the neural realization of
those representations.
From the re£ex loops governing take-o¡ and landing
responses or optomotor £ight stabilization, through the
servo systems underlying the chasing or tracking of one
£y by another, to the use of visual landmarks for navi-
gation, there exist published accounts of information-
processing or control-theoretic analyses, extensive
behavioural studies, and relatively rich neurological
data from identi¢able individual visual interneurones.
Yet to cast these analyses within a `model-based' or
`knowledge-based' framework would be, surely, to
reduce the notions of `model' or `knowledge' to vacuity.
Consider conspeci¢c-chasing behaviours: for a full
causal mechanistic analysis, it is necessary to acknow-
ledge that much of the `knowledge' about chasing £ies
of the same species is `represented' in the entire design of
the animal. From the anatomy and optics of the eye,
through the neural dynamics of the relevant sensori-
motor pathways, to the kinematics of the £ight motor
system, and indeed the aerodynamics of the whole £y:
a full account will treat the £y as a subsystem within
the coupled dynamical system formed by the interac-
tion of the agent and its environment. (Here the agent
is the chasing £y, and the environment is everything
else, the space through which the £y is chasing its
target, and any relevant objects in that space; the most
relevant of which is the target object, which will usually
be a conspeci¢c £y but might be many other things,
such as £ies of another species, distant birds, or peas
thrown by nearby biologists (e.g. Collett & Land
1975b).) Presumably the `knowledge' of important
system parameters (e.g. the £y's body shape, its
moments of inertia and coe¤cients of friction for both
angular and linear acceleration, etc.) is somehow
`represented' in the neural processes responsible for
sensory-motor coordination. But such loosely-sketched
representations often prove elusive when we consider
how the representations might be identi¢ed within the
system.
Again, we do not deny that external observers can
derive elegant and useful computational-level analyses
of the task faced by the chasing £y, and that these
analyses may involve variables which represent to us
(the observers) cogent factors in the environment. This
is our privilege as external observers. The £y, unable to
adopt the perspective of an external observer, has no
access to the representations or knowledge that we
humans might invoke when explaining the £y-chasing
system to other humans. To talk of knowledge or repre-
sentations being encoded or compiled by evolution into
the body design of the £y is to homuncularize either the
£y, the evolutionary process, or both.
To reiterate our argument: a priori, one could
construct a knowledge-based vision system which deli-
vers representations appropriate to the control of
chasing behaviour, but instead it appears that real £ies
are a collection of neat tricks that exploit the simplici-
ties and regularities of the environment and the
required behaviour, thereby circumventing the need
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for a full representation-manipulating vision system.
That is, it appears that £ies do not actually use represen-
tations, even though they could. A possible rejoinder to
this is to agree that £ies use no representations, but to
argue that more complex animals will have to form and
manipulate representations in virtue of the complexities
of either their environments, the behaviours required of
them, or both.We have some sympathy for this position
(because it admits that there are no representations in
£ies), but there are studies of animals more complex
than £ies which, again, we take as an indication that
structured knowledge-based representations may not
be involved: we brie£y review some of these below.
Consider the numerous studies of so-called `time-to-
contact' behaviours, where the time remaining before
impact of a seeing animal with some object or surface
plays an important role in exhibiting a desired beha-
viour (often because the behaviour has to be executed
or initiated some time before the moment of contact). A
clear example is Lee & Reddish's (1981) study of wing-
folding in the gannet, Sula bassana: hunting gannets dive
into the sea, from considerable cruising altitudes, to
catch ¢sh. The gannet's speed when it hits the water
(at near-vertical angles) can be as high as 24m s71. To
avoid injury, the gannet folds its wings into its body
before impact with the sea surface. But when the
wings are folded the gannet has greatly reduced aero-
dynamic control: it is essentially ballistic and hence it
cannot make any ¢nal adjustments to its £ight path,
and so is unable to compensate for any last-moment
evasive moves by the ¢sh. In simple but extreme
terms, if it folds too late, the gannet breaks its wings,
and if it folds too early, the gannet goes hungry.
Clearly, the ability to accurately judge the time-to-
contact with the sea-surface allows the gannet to
commence folding at a time tfold seconds before impact,
where tfold is also the time taken to fold the wings from a
steering position to a safe streamlined pose.
Now it is certainly not impossible that the gannet's
nervous system is forming and manipulating appropri-
ately structured internal representations of the external
3D environment, as would be required of a model-
based account. But there is a persuasive argument that
this is not the case: Lee (1980a) argued that a para-
meter , being the quotient of the rate of expansion of
a point on the retinal image and the distance of that
point from the pole of the optic £ow-¢eld, gives an
accurate measure of time-to-contact of the surface.
The  measure is particularly easy to derive if there is
a log-polar sampling of the retinal image (e.g. Wilson
1983). Thus, although time-to-contact could be derived
using a knowledge-based approach, the available
evidence is best accounted for by reference to a simple
metric, realizable in image-space (i.e. by a succession
of retinotopically projected neural sheets), being
employed.
Now, once again, defenders of the knowledge-based
or representational viewpoint may want to argue that
wing-folding is su¤ciently important to the survival of
gannets that evolution has e`ncoded' the relevant
knowledge and representations into the gannet visual
system. Presumably the `knowledge' concerns the
utility of  as an indicator of time-to-contact, and the
ease with which it can be derived from an appropriately
sampled optic £ow-¢eld. But, in the absence of clear
de¢nitions of Harvey's Q and S for the diving gannet,
to talk of representations within the system is to
homuncularize either the gannet or the evolutionary
process. Alternatively, it might be conceded that the
exploitation of regularities in the gannet's visual
environment (i.e. the numerator and denominator in
) does not constitute a representation-using system,
and we need to look at more complex animals or
agent^environment interactions.Yet there is a growing
body of comparable data from studies of human
subjects engaging in a variety of visually mediated
behaviours which are acquired and of little evolu-
tionary signi¢cance (in the sense that the behaviours
are unlikely to have played a part in selection pressures
that shaped the human visual sensorimotor system). In
tasks such as catching tennis balls (Lee 1980b), striking
the take-o¡ board on a long-jump track (Lee et al.
1982), braking or steering automobiles (Lee &
Lishman 1977), and leaping up to punch falling volley-
balls (Lee et al. 1983), there is evidence that the use of
simple features or metrics of the £ow ¢eld, including ,
can account for the fast reaction times involved, in a
far more parsimonious manner than any account
involving the formation and manipulation of struc-
tured representations. The similarities between these
results and Gibson's (1979) in£uential arguments for
`direct perception' are manifest.
Even in cases where the reaction times are not an
issue, manipulation of monolithic structured represen-
tations is questionable in several cases where su¤cient
data is available to form the basis for alternative
accounts. We brie£y summarize here two exemplar
bodies of work: computational neuroethological
studies of visually mediated behaviours in frogs and
toads, and recent machine vision work on using high
order statistical correlations in image space for a
variety of tasks.
The ¢rst involves an ongoing series of experiments
using computer simulations, behavioural studies, and
invasive neuroscience in which a team led by Michael
Arbib have developed sophisticated computational
models of the neural visuomotor mechanisms under-
lying predation in frogs and toads (e.g. Arbib 1987;
Corbacho & Arbib 1995; Cervantes-Pe¨rez 1995). In
brief, behavioural studies (e.g. Lock & Collett 1979)
have explored the responses of these animals when
faced with the task of moving to within snapping
distance of an initially distant food item (the `prey'),
given the presence of a `barrier'; often either a paling
fence or a wide, deep chasm. Computational models,
drawing heavily on the available neuroscience data
(e.g. Ewert 1987), are used to generate action sequences
for `virtual frogs' situated within simulated prey^
barrier environments. The behaviour of the virtual
frogs can then be compared to the real animals,
thereby suggesting additional re¢nements to the model
or further neuroscience experiments. For the purposes
of this discussion, the key indication from this body of
work is that separate neural pathways are maintained
for processing `prey' and `barrier' information, and
that any con£icts between the desire to approach prey
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and the need to avoid the barrier are resolved very late
in the neural pathway, close to the initiation of motor
schemas. This is in marked contrast with what would
be expected from a knowledge-based approach:
presumably this would require the frog to form an
internal representation of the external environment,
including the prey, the barrier(s), and possibly also the
frog itself; some reasoning or planning mechanism(s)
would then manipulate this representation to deter-
mine one or more possible paths to the prey, one of
which would be selected for execution. Once again,
this is an internally consistent way of doing things
and, in principle, a machine could be constructed
along these lines. But, unfortunately, all the available
evidence indicates that frog and toad visual systems
are not built the knowledge-based way.
The second example comes from machine vision
studies where tasks that might otherwise be achieved
using 3D model-based techniques, including the repre-
sentation of 3D shape and volume, are solved using
approaches which employ multivariate statistics in the
2D space of the image. In summary, these methods
involve applying statistical techniques such as principal
components analysis (PCA) to vectors of points system-
atically taken from signi¢cant contours in the image.
The statistical techniques give the primary modes of
variation of these contour-points in image space and,
crucially, these primary modes of variation are often
in close correspondence with variations in the 2D
projection of a 3D object as the pose of the object rela-
tive to the viewer is altered. That is, the 2D image
statistics capture regularities in the projected images of
3D objects in such a way that, to a fair approximation,
the 2D statistical model can be used to perform tasks
that might otherwise be assumed a priori to require
internal representations of 3D shape, volume, etc.
Examples of work in this area include Baumberg
(1995), Baumberg & Hogg (1996), Lanitis et al. (1995)
Again, this is not to say that a 3D model-based
approach would not be able to perform the task: the
work of Baumberg (1995), using image-space statistical
techniques to track movie sequences of walking people,
complements Hogg's (1983) earlier work on using
knowledge-based vision to perform much the same
task. But, given the ease with which arti¢cial neural
networks can approximate multivariate statistical tech-
niques such as PCA, it is tempting to ask whether real
neural networks perhaps employ high order correla-
tions in 2D image space to circumvent the complexity
of manipulating internal representations of 3D objects.
We see this as a provocative question which can only be
addressed by further research, but statistical arguments
have been presented as powerful alternatives to repre-
sentational accounts of lower order visual processes
(e.g. Srinivasan et al. 1982).
The examples we have given here, from studies of
insects, amphibians, birds, and humans, are by no
means conclusive proof of our arguments. However,
we believe that they are signi¢cant and persuasive
because, although all of the visually mediated tasks
involved could be performed using a knowledge-based
approach, the available evidence indicates that they are
not. In situations where an a priori consideration of the
task from a knowledge-based vision perspective might
lead an external observer or designer to posit the need
for structured internal representations, reconstructing
the external world, the best a posteriori explanation
may be signi¢cantly di¡erent, employing either no
representations, or representations very di¡erent from
those assumed to be useful on the basis of successful
engineering practices in machine vision.
6. SUMMARY: VISION WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE ?
It is easy to conjecture the need for knowledge and its
representation in vision either when introspecting, as
is seen in the experiments of Shepard & Metzler; or
when applying divide-and-conquer approaches to the
problem of designing a computational vision system,
as witnessed in the Marr pipeline; or when dealing
with the incomplete data o¡ered by neuroscience, as
happens when Marr's three-level methodology is
applied to analysing animal vision systems.
But preliminary experience with analysing evolved
arti¢cial visual systems indicates that, possibly, the
utility of descriptions and explanations involving
knowledge and its representation recede as analysis
progresses. A priori hypotheses involving the represen-
tation and manipulation or mobilization of knowledge
are undoubtedly useful for motivating discussion and
experimentation, but as more is made known about
the mechanisms involved, so the places where the
knowledge might be represented or encoded-in recede,
and when the analysis is complete, knowledge and its
representation are hard to identify in meaningful
terms, just as a`ggression' and `fear' play no part in
explaining Braitenberg's vehicles once the lid of the
black box is opened.
Our intention in this paper has simply been to high-
light the problems that arise when the language of
knowledge-based vision is applied to the analysis of
evolved machines, either animals or arti¢cial agents.
In these systems, where there has been no pre-commit-
ment to any representational scheme, the presence or
absence of knowledge and its representation become
empirical issues. To pursue the matter further requires
at least a consensus on what is meant by `knowledge'
and `representation'; and better still an operational
de¢nition of representation, such that replicable and
hence falsi¢able experiments can be proposed and
conducted.
It is certainly di¤cult to de¢ne the notions of know-
ledge and its representation su¤ciently accurately to
provide these operational de¢nitions. But until such
operational de¢nitions are agreed upon, arguments
that the structured representation of knowledge plays
no part in evolved visual systems are unsound. Yet,
surely, by the same reasoning, arguments that the
structured representation of knowledge does play a part
in evolved visual systems are also unsound.We might be
happy to agree that representations have a part to play
in explaining vision in animals and other evolved
machines, if only we could agree on what a representa-
tion is, and on who or what is using those
representations.
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